Ukraine: Westerners fear Putin’s “realism”

At the geopolitical level, Russia is dependent on its geography, and the Northern European plain, located between the North Sea, the Baltic Sea as far as Germany, Poland and the Czech Republic has offered continued possibility of invasion. its leaders for centuries. In the eyes of Kremlin strategists, direct or indirect control of access is an essential issue of national security.

The top of the Northern European plain to the west ends with that narrow corridor of Poland, which is thus equivalent to Vladimir Poutine an essential strategic pivot, to use the jargon of geopolitics. For the Russians, the long stretch of flat land stretching from France to Moscow provides a boulevard for Western invasions, but also a protection of almost 5000 km. Napoleon or Hitler then broke their teeth in the past.

The origin of the Russian mistrust

As Tim Marshall reminds us in his book Prisoners of Geography (2015), that Russia’s strategic paranoia is not entirely without historical basis. In 500 years, Russia has been invaded several times. The Poles crossed the plain of Northern Europe in 1605, followed by the Swedes under Charles XII in 1708, the French in 1812 and by the end of the Germans twice, in 1914 and 1941.

In particular, we argue for the last German invasion, a “great patriotic war” that cost the USSR more than 25 million lives. Vladimir Putin himself hails from Saint-Petersburg, former Leningrad, a martial city in World War II.

Victim of one of the longest sieges in modern history, Leningrad was surrounded by the Wehrmacht in 1941, and liberated in 1944 at a heavy price: 180,0000 Soviet deaths, including millions of civilians. Among them is Putin’s brother, whose modest family is forced to live in a city in ruins and perdition.

The victory of the Allies is therefore the perfect opportunity for Russia to extend its dominance over the border countries to defend its strategic core, giving aggregators a brutal and ruthless coloring for at least a tenth century traditional goal. It is no coincidence that the former Russian giant’s satellite countries fled into NATO armies when it crashed in 1991.

The American military shield promises to protect them against Russia whose strategic interests tend to form a “defense glacier”, that is to say a zone of direct or indirect influence on these European neighbors.

Ukrainian hot potatoes

And this is where Ukraine comes into play. While the Kiev government was pro-Russia, the Kremlin could not complain. It was still a buffer zone that would protect the Northern European plain that was so much feared by the Russians. As long as the country did not want to integrate the European Union or NATO, in order to maintain Russia’s treaty on Sevastopol in Crimea, everything was fine in the brave new world of Russian autonomy.

But the situation changed under the encouragement of Viktor Yanukovych, who thought he could have both ways, playing allegiance to Moscow as he sought to develop trade with the European Union, which reduced Putin’s diplomats to a Trojan horse of the Atlantic alliance. .

Now, from a Western and European perspective, living under the potential domination of Russian autonomy is not a very exciting program and the strategy of tension adopted towards the West for the sake of freedom and humanity is not the same. rights worldwide, and not just in central Europe.

She gets a great summary of it from the pen of Henry Kissinger, who, i world order (2014) contrasted a European polypolar balance mechanism with a Russian geopolitics formed “In the rugged steppe school, where a series of roaming crowds struggled for the current resources in the open terrain, with few defined boundaries. »

adds:

“The raids and enslavement of foreign civilian communities, and even the livelihood of some, were common incidents. […]. Russia asserted its connection to Western culture, but – as its dimensions increased exponentially – it came to regard itself as a sovereign and besieged civilization, which would achieve safety only by displacing its neighbors. under his will. »

We have been warned, therefore, that the liberal right of self – determination is not part of the Russian dictionary when communities are in close proximity.

Eurasian geographical pivot

If we need to talk about Western views, it is not a question of mixing it with a far – from – the – centric – European perspective. We find in the ideas of the British Halford J. Mackinder (1861-1947) the fear of the West vis-à-vis Russian autonomy, a fear that requires an understanding of the geopolitical chess board on a planetary scale, as he thinks it. For Mackinder, you can have worldwide leadership provided you find the right geographical point that acts as a historical “pivot”.

Eurasia is this geographical pivot. As Florian Louis explains:

“It would be wrong to believe that, because it is more developed, Western Europe is the most strategically important region of the Old World. Because, in fact, its current configuration is only ever a result of the pressure exerted by the peoples of the Eurasian steppes, a region that is the heart of the world (heartland).»

“He who rules Eastern Europe rules the middle ground. The one who rules the central world rules the global island (understanding the vast continental space of Europe, Asia and Africa). Who rules the global island that rules the world. »

Preserving the planetary equilibrium is essential, as the maritime powers, especially the United States and Great Britain, are trying to do in order to thwart the constitution of the vast Eurasian land power. Mackinder influenced many thinkers in the Cold War, especially Zbigniew Brzeziński.

Division and rule

The simplified anti-Eurasian analysis grid can explain America’s attitude towards Russia, both during and after the Cold War, especially towards NATO. While the Soviet Union is falling apart, the United States gives up trying to dismantle NATO, which was founded in Europe to fight the Soviet Union.

Worse still, the Americans are backtracking on Gorbachev’s promise not to extend the Atlantic alliance to include Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic in 1999. By amalgamating the former eastern countries, getting closer to China, everything fits together to avoid the formation of the Eurasian bloc. However, for a decade now, and despite Washington’s proactive foreign policy, it has been to the detriment not only of Europe, but of all democracies around the world.

In fact, Vladimir Putin has made a strategic turn by getting closer to China. As Nixon did to reduce the influence of the USSR, Putin is working hand in hand with Beijing to reduce the influence of the United States on the world. Russia speaks the same language as China.

Both are indifferent to human rights and democracy, considering only national and strategic interests, and are able to set aside their competition, especially in the Far East, to escape perceived American influence. being too invasive.

Recently, Russia has multiplied initiatives to make it more resilient to external economic tensions, especially in the banking and financial sector.

As David Teurtrie, a researcher at Inalco and a specialist in Russia, notes:

“The share of the dollar has fallen in central bank reserves. 87% of the population now has a national payment card, Mir. And, if the United States continued its threat to disconnect Russia from the Western Swift system, as it did with Iran in 2012 and 2018, financial transfers between banks and companies could now be made through local messaging.. »

In other words, Russia is organizing its independence from Washington, giving itself the means to resist any kind of future diplomatic and economic sanctions. So it is also a way to disarm Europe, which is in favor of this kind of methods against armed conflicts.

From the liberal point of view, a dilemma arises, freedom or peace. There is a danger that democracy as a political model and in general the freedom of individuals around the world will be undermined by the composition of blocs around Russia and especially China to influence international relations. It’s already receding in various parts of the world, starting with Hong Kong. On the other hand, the rise towards war driven by the Atlantic sentiment seems to have the least respect for the human catastrophe, but also for the free life that such a conflict could lead.

In both cases, there are two concepts of power and freedom. Can the concrete world of freedom in the world be made without the American shield, and what can be guaranteed that that shield, in the name of Russian tyranny, will not deteriorate in its an empire threatening freedom?